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Abstract: This article analyzes the strategy and rhetoric of the National Federation of
Settlements’ 1928 project on unemployment. During the Hoover years settlement workers
assembled an extensive catalog of case studies, which offer a glimpse into the home life of the
jobless and their families at the beginning of the Great Depression. From their research the NFS
Committee on Unemployment published a series of books and articles that depicted the
unemployed as the undeserving victims of economic change, and called for policies to protect
them. Throughout, settlement workers focused on the families of the unemployed, drawing on
gendered notions of work and family and lifting up policies that protected male breadwinner
households. Thus, settlement leaders re-cast unemployment as a social, rather than an economic,
problem. In all, settlement research, writing, and reception presented a skeptical voting public
with a palatable argument for social insurance that brought the experiences of the jobless to the
voting public and to policymakers, demonstrating a process of “policymaking from the middle.”
In so doing, they redeemed the newly unemployed and the insurance plans intended to protect
them.
Article text:
“It is going to take a great deal of educating,” settlement worker Helen Hall wrote to
Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot, to clear away the fog in the public mind caused by that
one small word ‘dole.’”1 Hall’s lament is unsurprising. After spending years working with other
reformers on the issue of unemployment, Hall was intensely aware that suspicions of jobless
workers were entrenched in American society. Moreover, Hall reflected a collection of ideas on
unemployment that were common among settlement workers at the beginning of the Great
Depression. Even before the economic crash, members of the National Federation of Settlements
argued that the plight of the unemployed was thoroughly misunderstood by the American public,
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and that it was through changing public opinion that settlement workers could affect social
welfare policy. Hall’s sentiments were the outgrowth of years of work on doing just that.
Beginning in 1927 the National Federation of Settlements had committed funds and time
to study unemployment, and to advocate for the regulation of the labor market and the relief of
the unemployed. Through the NFS Committee on Unemployment, settlement workers and their
allies proposed an argument in favor of unemployment relief, regulation, and insurance that was
accessible to average Americans and that explicitly connected changes in industry with changes
in workers’’ lives. Their research rested on a survey of over 300 unemployed families across the
nation and was showcased in two books and a series of articles. The first book, published in
1931, was Some Folks Won’t Work, a popular-press account of unemployment written by a
nonfiction writer named Clinch Calkins. The second was Case Studies of Unemployment.2
Published in 1932, Case Studies presented their research findings for social scientists to examine
and draw on. Helen Hall wrote one forward, as did another member of the Unemployment
Committee: Paul Kellogg, who was the editor of the landmark social welfare journal, Survey
Graphic.
Members of the Unemployment Committee entered a debate over social policy that had
developed at the beginning of the century and centered on what was called “social insurance.”3
Social insurance, as reformers discussed it, included health insurance, old age insurance,
workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance. Yet while policy experts and reformers
had been debating specific proposals to protect the unemployed, many Americans had only
recently begun to consider unemployment as an involuntary condition. Settlement workers in the
Unemployment Committee believed that although economists, policy experts, and reformers had
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long been discussing unemployment, their arguments were largely esoteric to average
Americans.
Settlement workers proposed to change how social policy experts and American voters talked
about unemployment, in several ways. First, the NFS Unemployment Committee offered
“average” Americans a digestible argument for regulating labor and providing for the
unemployed. Second, the NFS Unemployment Committee aimed to humanize unemployment to
persuade American voters and policymakers. They did so by offering personal stories that
introduced their readers to plight of the jobless, a strategy that proved the pervasiveness of
joblessness even in good times, and persuaded average Americans of the need to protect – rather
than condemn – unemployed workers.
In these two features, a look into the Unemployment Committee offers a path to
understanding social and social policy change that complicates the existing scholarship. Research
on the Progressive Era and the New Deal has, in general, argued that large-scale social policy
emerged from a few possible places. First, historians like Colin Gordon and Peter Swenson place
the engine of policy change in the hand of “corporate liberals:” class-conscious liberal capitalists
who recognized that regulation and unionization could provide order and build demand, and thus
worked closely with politicians to craft legislation that would placate workers and bring order to
industry. As Peter Sweson described them, these “business-financed New Deal Democrats” (like
GE’s Gerard Swope) “insisted that unemployment insurance was good business and not merely a
system of charitable payments to unfortunate workmen.”4 Second, scholars like Theda Skocpol
and Edwin Amenta emphasize the importance of existing bureaucratic structures and state-level
programs in social welfare (like Civil War pensions and widows pensions), as well as
Progressive concerns over corruption, in shaping social policy.5 Finally, others see the social
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welfare policies of the interwar period as a response to social protest. Whether they see social
policy as a genuine response to the needs of laborers or as a means of containing popular
upheaval, scholars like Lizabeth Cohen, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward agree that
worker agitation prompted policy change.6
Settlement workers, more than other reformers, offer a look at social policy change that can
be described as “history from the middle.” While the common narratives offered place the engine
for policy change either at the level of government or at the level of organized workers,
settlement workers serve as a reminder that policy change was a dynamic process, and that the
impetus for change often came from the middle. Settlement workers in the 1920s drew on their
direct experiences with workers in daily life to influence voters and policymakers on the need for
unemployment legislation. Thus, these reformers demonstrate policy as shaped by reformers who
understood both the demands of workers and the priorities and abilities of legislators. This
process can best be seen in their campaign for unemployment regulation and relief.7
Settlement workers also aimed to provoke change on unemployment by drawing on
traditional conceptions of family and work. Members of the Unemployment Committee bolstered
their defense of unemployment regulation by echoing popular arguments for a “family wage” – a
wage for a male breadwinner that could support the whole family – and thus reflected gendered
conceptions of labor and family. The NFS Unemployment Committee argued that the labor
regulations and unemployment insurance championed by pre-war reformers and economists
would primarily protect hardworking families that were headed by male breadwinners. In their
study on the home life of the unemployed, these reformers drew on maternalist notions of female
dependency in order to placate readers that might otherwise have bristled at the thought of
government support for the unemployed.
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In a few ways, this study of the NFS Unemployment Committee confirms research on the
family wage and maternalism. Scholars have rightly noted that maternalist reformers, whether in
casework or in the Children’s Bureau, employed essentialist notions of femininity to create
avenues for leadership and professional development, all of which had the effect of codifying
female dependence into social work and social welfare legislation. Moreover, historians studying
the family wage have lamented that scholarship in fact frequently replicates the myth that women
were naturally suited to the home rather than the workplace.8 As Alice Kessler-Harris argued,
this scholarship resulted in “an empirical literature rooted in the need to justify women’s wage
labor activities as a product of economic necessity.”9 In other words, historians need to be more
prepared to interpret women’s labor as willing and fulfilling. Indeed, well-known settlement
workers like Chicago Commons’ Lea D. Taylor supported arguments for unemployment
insurance that emphasized the dangers of female employment, all while nurturing a successful
career in reform. And the Unemployment Committee unabashedly described women’s work as a
“makeshift,” the unfortunate product of intense economic need.
Yet the Unemployment Committee also implies that a more nuanced analysis of maternalist
reform and the family wage is in order. While settlement workers echoed the ideological
defenses for the family wage, the Unemployment Committee’s work suggests a more
complicated interplay between ideology and pragmatism. In the height of the Great Depression,
settlement workers expressed an acknowledgement that women’s labor was not rewarded
sufficiently, and contended that the most effective way to ensure that entire families could
survive the crisis was by bolstering the labor market for men. Moreover, because of widespread
unemployment, the NFS Unemployment Committee took on the unusual task of defending relief
for men. Relief and charity had long been considered the safety nets of paupers, women, and
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children, but in the 1930’s NFS participants and settlement workers around the nation claimed
that relief was the right (though temporary) of men victimized by industrial confusion.
Settlement workers hoped that, whether through relief or unemployment regulation, men might
be able to again earn enough that their wives would not have to work multiple jobs and care for
their families. Certainly members of the Unemployment Committee espoused an ideology of
essential female dependency, but they did so in response to intense practical concerns.
In the end, settlement workers like Helen Hall proposed that the most effective strategy to
protecting the unemployed was to induce the voting public to demand a change in policy. As
members of the Unemployment Committee put it, their task was “to have material ready in order
to create public opinion and stimulate public action.”10 Thus, they used their research first, to
educate American voters on the plight of the jobless (and in this they rarely discussed specific
policies), and second, to educate policymakers and call for relief and social insurance. In the
process, they both redeemed unemployed workers from the stigma of pauperism and
reinvigorated a long-popular defense of family wage and the male breadwinner household.
Through their work in the Unemployment Committee, these settlement house workers
established new priorities for the settlement movement and took an active role in re-shaping the
debate on unemployment legislation and social policy.

Changing Public Opinion on Unemployment
In 1928 settlement workers and reformers, many of whom who had long made urban
working neighborhoods their homes, determined that their next project should be centered on
growing unemployment. Like many reformers, these settlement workers believed that reaching
voters was a crucial step in achieving legislative change, and presented themselves as the group
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most equipped to understand unemployment and to recommend its solution. While the NFS
ultimately endorsed plans for unemployment insurance, their primary goal at first was generating
empathy for the unemployed, and creating a demand for unemployment relief and labor
regulation. The NFS Committee on Unemployment, created at the 1928 conference of the NFS,
orchestrated a nation-wide survey of unemployment in United States industrial centers and
promised to position workers at the center of the conversation. With research and writing
settlement leaders promised to humanize unemployment, prove the pervasiveness of joblessness
in good times, and persuade Americans that workers deserved large-scale and federally
administered measures to prevent and deal with unemployment.
Other reform organizations had already established campaigns for unemployment insurance
and regulation, but settlement workers hoped to shift the conversation to workers themselves.
The most notable was the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), which by 1913
was, according to Daniel Rodgers, “the most active and important social insurance lobby in the
United States.”11 Established in 1906, the AALL initially drafted model legislation for
government-funded unemployment insurance. By the 1920s the AALL leader John B. Andrews
turned to an alternate model of regulation that emphasized prevention and enjoined employers to
lead the way in stabilizing the labor market.12 Through the 1920’s the NFS supported the
AALL’s work (and, indeed, Jane Addams served as a Vice President for the Association), and
NFS members likely concurred with the AALL leadership’s contention that reform workers
could mitigate class conflict by working with both labor and industry. Yet, when the NFS
committed to studying and campaigning for unemployment legislation, its leaders created a
campaign that was solely committed to advocating for, and speaking from the perspective of,
workers themselves.13
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Moreover, while settlement workers were new to the conversation on unemployment, they
argued that their close experience with vulnerable workers made them an especially good fit for
the task. They were the descendants of a Progressive-era movement that was famous for
establishing community-based houses in cities throughout the urban north (the most famous
being Hull House in Chicago). Locally, settlement workers moved into these houses and
established themselves as “good neighbors” to the economically disadvantaged, largely
immigrant populations among whom they lived. On the national level, settlement leaders from
Jane Addams to Lillian Wald successfully pushed for municipal and labor reforms in the early
twentieth century.14
In the wake of the First World War settlement workers led by Philadelphia’s Helen Hall
asserted that the Federation should use its intimate knowledge of workers and connections to
policy makers to address the issue of unemployment.15 Hall led the National Federation of
Settlements as an experienced neighborhood worker. A graduate of the New York School for
Social Work, Hall served as the director for University Settlement, a large settlement house in
Philadelphia. At University Settlement Hall witnessed the frequency with which her neighbors
reported joblessness, and the increasing difficulty that many of them had in finding work. The
“closeness of the settlements to their neighbors,” Hall reflected in 1959, “made them aware of
mounting unemployment even in 1927-28, … a time supposedly of wide prosperity.”16 As Hall
explained to the NFS, settlement workers were ideal for carrying out two lines of action: “one to
stir up governmental thought and action along the lines of unemployment insurance, and second
to bring out the human effect of the lowering of the standard of living and various methods of
relief.”17
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The establishment of the Unemployment Committee indicated that the NFS would shift its
priorities while maintaining strategies for engaging in social issues. Members of the NFS voted
the Unemployment Committee into action on the same day that they halted the work of the
Prohibition Committee, yet they also voted that the Unemployment Committee would take “as a
model the organization and procedure of the Prohibition Committee. By securing money for
research on joblessness, Hall shifted the attention of the NFS, from vice to jobs. Moreover, the
Unemployment Committee became so significant to the NFS that it was ultimately transformed
into the Unemployment Division, which housed various efforts related to unemployment
throughout the 1930’s. Hall and members of the Unemployment Committee believed that if they
could educate the public and policymakers about pervasive joblessness, then surely legislation to
protect the unemployed would follow.18
Their daily interaction with poor workers, and their history of relating structural problems to
personal consequences, rendered them ideal to make real headway on the issue of unemployment
insurance. Paul Kellogg, who was the editor of the popular social work journal, Survey Graphic,
served on the Unemployment Committee as an ally of the settlement movement. In a letter to a
fellow writer Kellogg declared, “while various agencies, from the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor to the Industrial Relations Counselors, are tackling the problem from one
angle and another, the settlement study has distinction in its canvass of consequences in terms of
intimate household and family experience.”19 In short, settlement workers and their allies thought
settlements the optimal place to carry out such a study.
In order to change public opinion, the committee undertook a large-scale research project
of the unemployed in settlement neighborhoods. Their research was grounded in a series of 300
household “pictures” collected by settlement workers at 104 settlements from 32 cities and towns
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in 21 states, and supplemented by analyses of group discussions and an unemployment-themed
essay contest. These resources would, the committee hoped, offer a more human-centered
description of the economic system than most Americans had seen. In the Unemployment
Committee members’ presentation to the NFS Executive Committee they were clear about the
purpose of the study, to create a domino effect: from stories, to education, to action.
Hall and the others on the committee20 relied on a strategy of presenting personal stories in
the packaging of social science research to make the case for social insurance.21 The committee
began with an extensive survey of unemployment in the nation. Between 1927 and 1930 they
developed a research plan, recruited settlements and community organizations to participate,
collected their findings, and assembled those findings into publishable material. In 1928 Hall and
the ten-member Executive Committee began writing a survey, which they hoped settlement
houses around the country would fill out and send back to them.22 These surveys asked
settlement house workers to transcribe the stories of at least five families suffering from
unemployment, to lead and take notes on settlement discussion groups on unemployment, and to
collect from their neighbors’ essays on life with unemployment. In order to acquire such
materials, the Executive Committee set up a Field Committee, comprised of nineteen settlement
workers who found settlements to fill out surveys, and then reminded, cajoled, and pressured
leaders in these settlements to collect and return research materials. In the end the committee had
around three hundred case studies, a substantial body of research on which to base their
arguments about unemployment and social insurance. In 1929 Albert Kennedy of the NFS
Executive Committee explained that their study would “reveal the social consequences of
unemployment as found in certain neighborhood families which have been intensively
studied.”23
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By focusing on stories and anecdotes telling the “social consequences of unemployment,”
settlement workers hoped to resonate with the kinds of Americans who were unmoved by
economists. The household pictures they offered depended on a specific relationship common
between settlement workers and their neighbors, in which settlement workers considered their
neighbors as research subjects and delved into their personal lives. These were consensual
interviews, and unemployed families often demonstrated an appreciation for such a study, but
settlement workers’ methods also relied on a system that filtered and at least partially assessed
the unemployed. The committee was upfront about this strategy, even in publication. “It is
common to regard the unskilled laborer statistically,” Calkins lamented in Some Folks Won’t
Work. “He is not a person,” she continued. “He is a unit of production. … Yet if we see them in
their homes, making the struggle which differentiates us from the earthworm, can we still regard
them without empathy?”24 Writing to a public audience, Calkins framed their quasi-scientific
methods as an especially appealing part of their work, because the stories of the unemployed
would reach a previously untouched audience.
Calkins’ work exemplifies the part of the unemployment study that aimed to galvanize
popular opinion, yet the Committee hoped that they could reach two distinct audiences: an
educated, middle-class readership, and social science researchers. Their two books were thus
aimed at these two groups of people, who settlement workers believed were necessary in the
project of establishing social service legislation. The more general work, with the catchy (and
perhaps misleading) title Some Folks Won’t Work, guided readers through a description of
unemployment: its causes, the “makeshifts” used by its victims, and its long-term consequences.
Even though the aptly titled Case Studies of Unemployment incorporated far less interpretation
than Some Folks Won’t Work, Hall and Paul Kellogg each provided an introduction that spelled
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out their arguments about unemployment. In the years following its publication, moreover, Hall
and the NFS aimed to use Case Studies to influence legislators at the state and federal level to
pass legislation for the unemployment relief and insurance. Hall also wrote numerous articles
based on their research, for journals with an educated, middle-class readership, including Survey
Graphic and The New Republic.25
By using relatable language, by focusing on the workers and their families, and by drawing
on gendered ideas of family organization, settlement leaders suggested that the unemployed were
not to be viewed with suspicion, and the government was not exempt from the problem.

The Settlement Case for Social Insurance
The public debate over unemployment insurance emerged in the beginning of the century and
captivated reformers, economists, and industrialists into the 1920’s. While policy experts and
reformers frequently used the term “social insurance” – an umbrella term encompassing health
insurance, old age insurance, compensation for injury, and unemployment insurance – all of
them addressed unemployment specifically and drove the debate over unemployment legislation.
The concept of unemployment itself, which implied that some jobless people were involuntarily
so rather than paupers or loafers, was fairly new to most Americans. Yet, beginning in 1909,
especially in light of European systems of social insurance, economists and social scientists
began to question the wisdom of expecting low unemployment in a healthy market. By the
twenties a small but significant group of intellectuals had produced studies of unemployment that
suggested that it was an endemic problem of industry.
Settlement leaders argued that the ideas put forth by established economists and social policy
experts were too esoteric to reach the kinds of average Americans who, they said, could sway
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public policy. Economists like William Beveridge and William Leiserson both proposed that
organized labor markets, state-administered labor exchanges, and public works projects would be
able to predict and manage periods of unemployment, proposals that the NFS campaigners
echoed. For economists and policymakers who had long understood unemployment to be
sporadic and unexpected, Beveridge and Leiserson’s recommendations included solutions that
were far more interventionist than had previously been favored.26 Leiserson argued that
economic measures, such as labor exchanges, unemployment insurance, and targeted public
works projects, could go a long way in regulating employment and making the most of the labor
market.27 Yet, Unemployment Committee members recognized, their arguments were largely
inaccessible to non-experts. Beveridge’s Unemployment: A Problem of Industry was an
intimidating 317 pages long, and its eleven chapters and four appendices included topics like,
“The Sources of Information: the unemployed percentage,” and “Cyclical Fluctuation: Alternate
rise and fall of average unemployed percentage in periods of years.”28 While some specialists
were captivated by Beveridge’s recommendations, many Americans likely struggled to even
understand them.29
The Unemployment Committee aimed to reshape the kinds of proposals put out by Beveridge
and his contemporaries, in order to make them accessible and compelling to American voters and
policymakers alike. Written for audiences that seemed slow to embrace social insurance, Some
Folks Won’t Work and Case Studies of Unemployment were based on the premise that the United
States economic system, even when functioning smoothly, contained cracks through which
hardworking and well-intentioned workers and their families could easily fall. They argued that
too many Americans believed that unemployment was only a problem of “hard times,” a sign of
a faltering economy, from which workers would recover when the market righted itself. With
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that in mind, the committee members structured their research and writing with an attention to,
“the inadequacy of our scheme of protecting such families against the hazard of unemployment
in normal times.”30 While the encroaching depression certainly gave purchase to their books, this
was the crux of their argument: unemployment was an unavoidable side effect of the American
economic system, one that industrial and political leaders had thus far not dealt with. In other
words, Hall later described, the significance of their research “was not that it was a measure of
the mass unemployment which has roused our American communities to action in hard times,
but of an evil to which, for the most part, they have been blind when times were good.”31
The subtext of this argument was that the escalating depression was not the only (or primary)
instigator of unemployment, so the solution to unemployment needed to address regular bouts of
joblessness.32 Paul Kellogg, in the “Foreword” to Case Studies of Unemployment, explicitly
differentiated between the big crisis – which he said was complicated and would attract the
attention of economists, financiers, and statesmen – and regular, cyclical unemployment. “We
should distinguish,” he said, “between the grand strategy of overcoming the causes of business
depression (and its resulting mass unemployment) and the tactics of closing in on unemployment
as a recurring and measureable risk of modern production.”33 Unemployment as experienced by
workers and their families was, he argued, simpler and more manageable than the economic
crisis, and warranted immediate action. While their recommendations would not solve the
economic crisis, Kellogg said, they would “cut down the bulk of unemployment … and bring an
orderly easement to wage-earning households which now bear the brunt of this recurring and
measureable risk over which they have no control.”34
Beyond characterizing unemployment as part of a functioning economic cycle, Kellogg
actually described it as the product of modern industrial development, and as warranting equally
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modern solutions. In a 1929 letter he explained that “The settlement group is the only body of
social workers to as yet face the fact that we are dealing with something different from the old
unemployment of hard times – we are dealing with the new unemployment of technical change
and progress.”35 Hall echoed Kellogg’s sentiments in the introduction to Case Studies, writing
“Experience has taught us to recognize broken work not merely as a symptom of financial crises,
but as a recurring fault of modern production.”36
To emphasize modernity as more significant than the emerging depression Kellogg, Hall and
Calkins focused on the detrimental effect that technological advancements and consumer fads
had on workers. News butchers, who sold newspapers on trains, saw their work disappear with
the advent of bus travel in the 1920s, and ticket choppers became obsolete as turnstiles were
installed at train and subway stations. Calkins described musicians who played in theater
orchestras and found themselves out of work with the development of the Vitaphone, which
could show pictures with sound. What should we do, they asked, for the skilled maker of wire
hat frames who suddenly finds that women no longer want to wear his hats? And can we expect
the ice cutter to easily transition to another skill when refrigerators have become widespread?37
Even for those employed in seemingly timeless occupations, the NFS studies argued,
seasonal slackness could halt otherwise steady employment. Settlement workers (erroneously)
described the farmer as an independent laborer who could prepare for the seasonal ups and
downs of his work, and they argued that industry should be held to the same standards as
agriculture. Expert finishers (who provided interior finishing on wood and walls) and woodcutters, they suggested, should be able to expect their bosses to prepare for slack times.38
If unemployment was a side effect of modern production, committee members claimed, a
modern system should be able to manage it. In the same way that industrial leaders protected
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their raw materials, it was a waste to allow their labor supply to rot in a down cycle. When an
experienced longshoreman found himself unemployed because of the winter chill, his employers
were not just subjecting him and his family to a reduced income, but they were also wasting a
precious commodity and allowing it to go unused. Indeed, Kellogg shamed industrial and
political leaders for their mismanagement of such resources. Kellogg wrote satirically: “If we
were to take a leaf out of the modest proposal of Dean Swift and organize a Society for Wasting
Labor Power & Gutting the Wage-Earning Market, it would promote exactly our present-day
policies of irregular employment and would set its cap for an occasional cyclical depression.”39
Working in corporations that had used scientific management to boost wages while still making a
profit, laborers had every reason to expect their employers (or the government) to manage
periods of high unemployment. And modern business, Kellogg and Calkins claimed, should have
the capacity to manage their labor power through predictable lulls in demand.
Above all, the books placed the responsibility on employers and the government – rather than
the unemployed – to ease the effects of joblessness. Unemployment was neither the fault of the
jobless, nor should they be expected to muddle through it unaided. The ultimate burden of
unemployment, Calkins declared, “falls upon men least able to bear it and frequently upon those
in no way responsible for its incidence.”40 Calkins offered perhaps the most pointed analogy,
which suggested that it was up to the federal government and employers (rather than workers) to
protect the victims of economic downturns. Referencing the widely popular workman’s
compensation legislation, which had at that time passed in most states, Calkins described
industrial unemployment as a parallel problem to industrial accidents. Just as with industrial
accidents, unemployment was a problem that employers should attempt to prevent and respond
to. Not only did this analogy place the onus of managing unemployment outside of the hands of
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workers themselves, it also rendered unemployment as a fully treatable condition. The solution,
as the proposed it, would be a combination of economic planning and stabilization, and “some
form of protection for families caught by the dislocations of work which we fail to control.”41
Disregarding what they saw as an unwarranted faith in political leaders, members of the
Unemployment Committee called for change in social policy. A temporarily unemployed
worker, they argued, should be able to count on the government, employers, and private agencies
to make the best use of their labor. In their books, Hall and Calkins both called for three steps to
safeguard workers: first, the regularization of production as enacted by employers; second, a
system of public works projects that could step in when private industry failed; and third, a
federal employment system that could coordinate and modernize state and municipal
employment agencies. This line of action, Hall explained, was “to modernize our public
employment services, to lift the standards of private agencies, and to weed out the abuses and
inefficiencies of our present haphazard methods of labor placement.”42 In addition, Hall called
on the NFS to push for greater legislation related to unemployment insurance and relief, as in
1932, when the NFS published a resolution stating that it “expresses its conviction that
unemployment insurance is essential to preserve a minimum standard of economic security; and
that it urges the governor of every American state to press for the enactment of … measures to
protect American standards of living at their most vulnerable point.”43 While their
recommendations were often somewhat unspecific, the Committee’s main goal was to catalyze
business and government involvement.
When Hall made her case she reflected the hallmarks of the settlement campaign for social
insurance:
No one who scans the ups and downs of American business enterprise, our changes in
techniques and styles and markets, the shiftings of industry from one region to another,
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can but see that there will still be need for protection of some sort against unprevented or
unpreventable unemployment over which the worker himself has no control.44
Workers were helpless in the face of technological change, consumer demand, and standard
economic cycles, they argued, and thus deserved the protection of the state. Perhaps most
importantly, though, the settlement campaign for social insurance insisted that this social policy
was about workers themselves, not the labor market.

Unemployment in Families
To persuade their readers that economic cycles warranted legislative change, Committee
members humanized the plight of the jobless by shifting the conversation out of the workplace
and positioning it in the home. Anticipating readers who perceived of unemployment as an
impersonal issue of job placement, left to labor and business analysts, Calkins wrote a narrative
of good families trying to survive a catastrophe, and suggested that unemployment’s real victims
were families, not industrial leaders or even just laborers. In so doing, the Committee
reconstituted the jobless: once perceived as paupers and loafers, workers in this telling (and their
families) were the hapless victims of changes outside of their control.
A central goal of the work was to exonerate the unemployed for their condition, a difficult
task given that their readership was fundamentally suspicious of the jobless. Some Folks Won’t
Work directly challenged the popular myth that “if a man really wants to work, he can find it.”45
This myth served as an undercurrent of much public resistance to social insurance, and dispelling
it became central to the Committee’s work.46 Calkins opened Some Folks Won’t Work with a
description of the kind of person who was influenced by such misinformation: an insurance agent
who, because of the mystifying nature of the economy, genuinely believed the worst of the
unemployed. “I tell you there isn’t any such thing as being idle for people if they have any
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gumption,” Calkins claimed such a person would say, “Some people won’t work. I’d like to see
anybody keep me out of a job.”47 The average working American, Calkins’ anecdote suggested,
was ignorant regarding unemployment. Yet her tone offered readers the opportunity to become
someone other than this insurance agent. As Calkins described, the agent believed the
unemployed were unwilling to work, in spite of the availability of jobs. With a better sense of the
causes of unemployment, Calkins implied, the reader would likely come to see the situation quite
differently.
The NFS Committee members acted on the belief that “average” Americans misunderstood
the causes and pervasiveness of unemployment, a suspicion that was made manifest even by
other settlement workers. In Columbus, Ohio, the Gladden Community House opted out of
participating in the study because of their faith in the current system of managing unemployment
– in which the jobless relied on private agencies and spurts of state and federal assistance, often
channeled through private agencies or public bureaus of charity. C.H. Bogart, the Gladden head
resident, informed Irene Nelson that, “President Hoover will undoubtedly conduct through
governmental channels a study of unemployment in which settlements are in a unique position to
cooperate.”48 Bogart and his allies seemed to maintain faith in ad hoc government responses to
poverty, and implied that the Committee was stepping out of line in their work.49
Even more pernicious, Hall soon discovered, was the popular belief that in the 1920s most
people without jobs were unemployed for personal reasons like injury or illness, or could expect
to be employed again soon. Nelson quoted one settlement caseworker as saying, “These spells of
unemployment don’t last; if a man amounts to anything he can always get work…”50 Nor did
they believe that it was possible to be unemployed and employable at that time. Hall, unphased,
brushed off this skepticism as the reaction of a “Case Hardened” Family Case Worker, someone
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who had seen enough dishonesty to distrust anyone requesting aid.51 To Hall and Unemployment
Committee members, the presence of dissention within the NFS was not surprising, and
indicated the extent to which average Americans misunderstood joblessness.
Thus, Calkins clued her readers into the great disconnect between secure Americans and the
unemployed, an argument that emphasized the invisibility of the jobless and the fallibility of
popular conceptions about the unemployed. One story she told, which she described as the
“ironic niceness of the incident which lately occurred in a public school of Philadelphia,” offered
her readers a chance to be self-aware and to adopt behaviors to distinguish themselves from
those in denial about unemployment. Calkins described, “an undernourished child [who] was
given by the school doctor a medicine to whet her appetite,” a solution that (in Calkins’ telling)
would usually denote concern for the well-being of a student. “As time went on,” Calkins
continued, “and she continued to give evidence that she was not eating enough, a visit was paid
to her home. There it was discovered she had little to eat.”52 This description of misguided
assistance assured readers that, yes, even good people could miss the prevalence of
unemployment. As such it both educated readers and affirmed their fundamental goodness.
To further disassemble misunderstandings about unemployment, Calkins and the NFS
introduced secure Americans to a category of deserving poor: the unnecessarily jobless. In Some
Folks Won’t Work Calkins argued that the poor families they aimed to protect were hardworking
and worthy of assistance. “There are many of these who would rather starve than accept charity,”
Calkins informed the reader. “Unfortunately, physical laws break down their natural hauteur, and
charity makes its hateful entrance through sick relief, perhaps.”53 Charity, Calkins stated, was far
from a first solution. Over numerous chapters she described a sequence of “makeshifts,” steps
that the unemployed took to get by. The jobless were tireless at “hunting the job”: answering ads
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in the paper, walking miles in search of work, and paying often untrustworthy private
employment agencies to find work for them. At home they sold valuables like furniture and
engagement rings, moved into cheaper housing, and even split up the family among extended
family members or invited additional renters to bear the housing cost. Charity was often a last
resort. These makeshifts made up the bulk of Calkins’ popular press argument about
unemployment: the unemployed and their families were not sitting around and waiting for the
government to bail them out. They were thrifty, industrious, and still barely surviving.54
The task of finding and highlighting “worthy” poor families became central to the
Unemployment Committee’s strategy for changing popular opinion about unemployment
insurance. Believing that unemployed families – especially those who had not previously relied
on charity – represented an invisible or misunderstood segment of the poor population,
Committee members made it their duty to expose the nation to these men and women. “I am
convinced,” Nelson confessed to Hall, “that there is a whole stratum of the population who are
really having the devil of a time and about whom absolutely nothing is known – they have kept it
all under their hats, or at least within the circle of a few obscure and inarticulate friends.55 By
characterizing their subjects as formerly unseen, and as previously unknown to social service
agencies, Nelson preemptively excused any future forays into charity as unusual and necessary –
these families acted from blameless desperation and not from a place of dependence.
The Committee’s research strategy reflected their commitment to exonerating the “right”
kind of jobless individuals, and they thus chose to publish only the stories of the “blameless
poor” – men who were capable and willing to work – and their families. When the Committee
requested case stories from settlements they offered this as a suggestion to head-workers. “Cases
should be chosen,” they recommended, “in which the wage-earner through suffering from
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continuous or intermittent unemployment, is still considered employable.”56 Over and over they
articulated what kind of family they wanted to rely on. As Hall counseled Lea Taylor,
the test I applied was simply this: is or was the unemployment due to causes
entirely outside the family’s control and are there definite consequences which
can be set down and described as fact? As you say, we shall have to search for
families in which unemployment is not interwoven with other factors in
producing their present situation.57
This specific targeting of the “best” of the unemployed reveals that despite their progressive
understandings of persistent unemployment, the settlement Unemployment Committee mobilized
some rather traditional notions about the poor in order to defend jobless workers. They
demonstrated the deservedness of jobless workers by highlighting their lack of dependence on
charity. When Irene Nelson described the five “best” families she had run into, she commented
to Helen Hall that “It is interesting that not one of my five is known to any charitable
organization, and this without my having specified that we should prefer the sort.”58 Thus the
Committee paradoxically contributed to a discourse about poverty that associated accepting
relief with failure, a seemingly unintentional byproduct of arguing that poor workers in the
1930’s were not to blame for their predicament.59
If one of the features of faultless poor workers was that they had never relied on charity, then
committee members connected being independent with deserving aid. In a letter to a discouraged
Irene Nelson, Helen Hall offered consolation that revealed her strategies and beliefs about relief.
Nelson had written complaining of the resistance she faced from caseworkers at family-centered
social service agencies, who argued that their clients did not fit the requirements that Nelson was
looking for. “In taking the Family Case Workers reaction,” Hall counseled, “we must realize that
they get the type of family which we do not want particularly to include in our work.”60 In other
words, Family Case Workers, who were more likely to see domestic disputes, juvenile
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delinquency, and other “behavioral” issues, would likely not see many of the worthy poor who
would make solid cases for study.61
Hall’s subsequent thoughts more clearly indicate the intellectual consequences of shaping
their study around the “best” unemployed families. “I think that we of the Settlements feel,” she
explained, “that almost the keenest suffering and the greatest change of standards come often in
the family which does not resort to the relief giving agencies.”62 The Committee’s strategy, then,
required that they establish markers for this kind of person, such as prior requests for aid or a
relationship with a family service agency. “Our settlement study,” Kellogg explained to readers
of Case Studies of Unemployment, “sought to disentangle the unemployed from the
unemployable by dealing only with families whose predicament was due to industrial causes
outside their control.”63 The Unemployment Committee intentionally structured their research
project so as to defend the unemployed against judgment and to show that such families accepted
charity only as a result of a systemic failure. In effect, the Committee was distinguishing
between the kinds of people who should be supported by unemployment insurance and those
who should not, and Calkins carried these implications into publishing.
The NFS Unemployment Committee turned their attention to families in order to persuade
their readers of the importance of unemployment regulation. By focusing on families rather than
just the labor market, Calkins compelled readers to acknowledge and respond to the plight of the
unemployed. The economic system (seasonal slackness, technological innovation, and periodic
downturns) rendered individuals unemployed, and they and their whole families struggled to
survive. “Clearly whether unemployment is controllable or uncontrollable,” Calkins stated by
way of conclusion, “its ultimate burden falls upon men least able to bear it and frequently upon
those in no way responsible for its incidence. Most of the great modern nations have provided
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their workers with some form of insurance against such unemployment. We have not.”64
Moreover, the NFS Unemployment Committee suggested that a breadwinner’s joblessness
carried consequences for the entire family, and perceived of the family as the social unit in which
people experienced unemployment, rather than as individuals, or collections of workers, or
communities.65 In this, the Unemployment Committee humanized jobless workers, in the process
recasting them as victims, rather than paupers.

Preserving the Male Breadwinner Family
Beyond merely emphasizing families, the Unemployment Committee proposed a specific
definition of “family” that would have been amenable to their readers, and which established
employment as fundamentally male. By emphasizing widely accepted conceptions of the male
breadwinner family structure, the Committee could argue for government intervention in dealing
with unemployment (social insurance) without alienating their readers. This rhetorical strategy
likely reassured readers of the non-radical nature of their campaign, and demonstrated that
federal insurance would preserve, rather than revolutionize, the American social fabric.66 Thus,
these reformers drew on Progressive “maternalist” policies, which emphasized female
dependence and the state’s obligation to preserve the male breadwinner family structure.
For Settlement researchers, the right kind of family was also one that affirmed a family
structure centered on a male breadwinner. In a recorded roster of 148 case studies, the
researchers organized it around each family’s breadwinner. Each family was titled according to
its (male) breadwinner, and catalogued by nine categories: name, case number, nationality, sex,
age, vocation, last occupation, others earning (like children or women), and dependents. They
only listed 10 female breadwinners, even though 43 wives made it in the category of “others
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earning.” It is perhaps a given that none of the women who were listed as breadwinners had
husbands as dependents, and it would be anachronistic to expect married women to be listed as
breadwinners. The structure of this roster, though, proves the narrative that Hall and settlement
workers were trying to tell: that whole families were suffering because of an economic condition
that attacked (male) breadwinners specifically. In presenting this narrative they set up a social
ideal – that men were breadwinners even in families in which their wives and children worked –
that did not necessarily reflect the reality of increased female employment throughout the
twenties.67
The Settlement study echoed a longstanding discourse in the United States about motherhood
and wage labor. In the 19th and early 20th centuries many laborers and reformers concurred that
families benefitted most from a breadwinner model, in which fathers worked and mothers were
able to focus on mothering. This was the American iteration of maternalism, defined by Sonya
Michel and Michael Koven as "ideologies and discourses that exalted women’s capacity to
mother and applied to society as a whole the values they attached to that role: care, nurturance,
and morality.”68 Scholars have long emphasized the significant role that maternalist ideology
played in Progressive-era reform work (especially, even, settlement work). For reformers,
notions of gender difference offered avenues for professional advancement. As Robyn Muncy
effectively argued, reformers drew on common notions of womanhood, and asserted themselves
(as women) as naturally positioned to create policy that affected women.69 For the targets of
reform, maternalist policies were often imbued with middle-class, white sensibilities, and
inflected women with the same notions of inherent nurturance and, ultimately, dependency.
Much of maternalist social welfare work simultaneously reflected and shaped a labor market
that gave preference to male labor, a pattern that bolstered calls for a family wage. Progressive

25

reformers influenced by maternalism partnered with labor leaders like Samuel Gompers of the
American Federation of Labor and the John R. Commons of the American Association of Labor
Legislation to establish a wage by which men could earn enough in wage labor to support his
wife and children. As Martha May argued, family wage advocates worked to challenge “the
ideology of working-class poverty” by removing women from the workforce, thus
simultaneously (in theory) boosting wages and allowing women to practice “true womanhood.”70
The product of reformers’ emphasis on the male breadwinner family was that their policies
codified dependency among working-class women. By the 1920s, minimum wages tended to be
higher for men than women, while working or working-class women were expected to rely on
charitable aid when their circumstances prevented them from receiving the security of a male
breadwinner family.71
The NFS study of unemployment echoed the maternalist preference for male breadwinner
households. From the study’s framing, NFS researchers advocated a system of employment that
centered on men and discouraged women’s work. In the chapter on “Makeshifts” in Some Folks
Won’t Work, Calkins put a mother’s employment as virtually the last makeshift that a family
might turn to during times of unemployment – listed after selling goods, borrowing, living on
credit, and even eating less. In a 1932 conference, Hall suggested the same. After describing how
families cut down on food, she explained: “There is still another reserve that the family found
within itself [this comes after “cutting down on food”]. The mother goes to work – for she can
often get a job when the man cannot.” What’s interesting here is that Hall connects this – a
seemingly cultural argument about women working – with their larger argument regarding the
nation’s industrial and financial structure. “When the bankers and industrialists, the engineers
and managers have not, in their organization of industry, enough work for the men” Hall
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continued, “enter Mrs. Jenkins, Mrs. Levy, Mrs. Carbino and the rest.”72 Women worked as a
last resort, and their employment indicated a failure in the economy rather than a successful
adaptation to new conditions.
In part, the Committee’s work offers a reflection of common assumptions among working
class families themselves, that the male breadwinner family was preferable. One of Irene
Nelson’s favorite family stories, that of the Clark family from Philadelphia, nicely illustrates the
role of gender in conversations about unemployment. Frank Clark described his life without
work for a caseworker: “You see it’s because I’ve always worked so steady that I’ve got nervous
about being out of work now,” making him a perfect candidate for their study. Clark emphasized
both his resistance to letting his wife work, and the reality that it may be necessary. “I don’t
believe in my wife working,” he said, “although she did when I didn’t know it during the year I
was away, and paid the first money on our house out of what she saved.” Nelson understandably
hoped that the Clarks might find some relief, but what’s interesting is that when she expressed
this sentiment to Hall she wrote “Poor Mrs. Clark! – let’s hope her story may stir people to do
something about unemployment.”73 In one sentence, then, Nelson laid out her belief that women
unfairly bore a significant portion of the burden of unemployment, even though they were not
expected to be breadwinners. Moreover, by positioning Mrs. Clark as the victim, Nelson’s
lament suggested that a woman’s employment was part of the problem, rather than a possible
solution.
Scholarship on the family wage frequently centers on the ideological arguments that
reformers used to defend male breadwinner households. As Martha May has shown, a significant
number of reformers agreed with Florence Kelley, who said in 1912: “It is the American
tradition that men support their families, the wives throughout life, and the children at least until
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the fourteenth birthday.”74 This tradition, scholarship suggests, was bound up with ideas about
appropriate and ideal gender roles. Historical accounts focused on labor organizers, reformers
focused on Mother’s Pensions, and a variety of individuals concerned with the effects of
industrialization on the family, frequently explain the focus on the family wage and women’s
depressed wages as a product of women’s “special relationship to the home.” National bills like
the Sheppard-Towner Act and state-by-state legislation like Mothers’ Pensions were thus aimed,
explains Primilla Nadasen, at returning women to their “proper – even sacred – domestic role.”75
Maternalist policies for social welfare and labor reform thus expressed an ideology rooted in
what perceived innate gender roles, and positioned women as fundamentally domestic and
dependent.76
Reformers advocating for male breadwinner households, moreover, cautioned that when
women worked they upset gender norms and put their families at risk. According to Allan
Carlson, Catholic thinkers like Father John Ryan and Progressive reformers like John Spargo and
Annie Daniel all argued that women’s work could be blamed for evils like child malnourishment,
infant mortality, and juvenile delinquency.77 Settlement workers were certainly not immune to
maternalist sensibilities. In 1910 Jane Addams decried that "the long hours of factory labor
necessary for earning the support of a child leave no time for the tender care and caressing which
may enrich the life of the most piteous baby."78 Such language reveals the extent to which these
reformers – often single, often childless, always professional – expected poor women to embody
longstanding traits of “true” womanhood, for the sake of their children.
In many ways, the National Federation of Settlements’ Unemployment Study does confirm
scholars’ assessment of maternalism and the family wage. Much like scholarship that presents
reformers as warning that working mothers put their families and children at risk, the stories
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presented in Some Folks Won’t Work were harrowing examples of what could happen to
hardworking, faultless families when the job market shifted and their male breadwinner was
rendered jobless. In an article for the Chicago Daily News Graham Taylor warned that men
without work would inevitably lose the respect of their families and their own self-respect.
“Faith in him changes to hope, to fear, to suspicion, to judgment that he is no good,” Taylor
lamented. “He grows sullen, curses, begins to drink, turns against the good, the law, the
government—and before he knows it he drifts into crime.”79 Moreover, in Some Folks Calkins
argued that without the regulation of unemployment, women and children were vulnerable to
overwork, exhaustion, and even serious ailments. Expecting women to bear the financial burden
of unemployment, they argued, was akin to sending them to their graves, and their families to the
poorhouse.80
The NFS support of a male-centered household, though, came from practical concerns, and
as such challenges scholars of maternalism and the family wage to take more seriously the
complicated interplay between ideology and material reality. They clearly knew that in working
class households women regularly supplemented (or provided alone) the family income, but they
cautioned against it for practical reasons. As she described the tendency of women to earn less
than men, Calkins offered the common explanations for paying women less: “Her physical
inferiority made her less widely useful when arm power counted, for there were fewer kinds of
things she could do. Her physical cycles made her emotions unsteady. And most of all she had,
even if only a legendary one, a husband or a father to support her. She could work for pinmoney.”81 Calkins relied on common stereotypes about women’s abilities and temperament not
to justify their limited wages but to explain to readers why a family could not (and should not
have to) rely on a female breadwinner. But without protections and social insurance for the
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unemployed, women would have to continue to work for miserly compensation, only
perpetuating the income disparity. Calkins lamented that “novels could be written about this
particular period in unemployment – the almost invariable shift of wage-earning from the man’s
to the woman’s shoulders because women will work for less pay.”82 Thus, a mother working
indicated a drop in family income – a very material problem that warranted action.
The NFS Committee drew on the widespread commitment to a male-breadwinner household
to advocate for regulation on unemployment. As these statements demonstrate, members of the
Committee echoed ideas of difference in order to rectify a real practical problem: that the labor
market prohibited women from earning enough to make the difficult work worth it. Members of
the Unemployment Committee recognized that women were in fact paid less (largely because
employers thought women were less suited to industrial labor than their husbands), which
rendered them the primary beneficiaries of a generous policy for social insurance. While Some
Folks in some ways emphasized women’s natural suitability for domestic life, it was in large part
the reality that an employed mother would not earn enough for her family drove the
Unemployment Committee to count men as breadwinners, and the male-centered family as ideal.
Therefore, it is a mistake to assume that supporters of the male breadwinner household did so for
purely ideological reasons.
Some Folks also made claims to the dangers of women working, but they did so without
emphasizing women’s responsibility to care for their families, and thus exhibited a less
ideologically laden analysis of women’s work. Rather than focusing solely on the dangers that
female employment bore for children, according to Calkins, the dangers posed by a family’s
dependence on female labor went beyond the family economy, to a mother’s health. Because
working mothers frequently remained responsible for much of the housework, settlement
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workers rightly suggested, a working mother was likely a wearied woman. The books tried to
deal with the very real, physical consequences of a woman working – that she found herself
cleaning at nights and cleaning, cooking, and child-rearing during the day. Hall said that “the
stories abound in the results of the double load on their shoulders:” exhaustion, illness, and
sometimes death. One working mother, described in Case Studies on Unemployment, was only
able to sleep by resting her head on the kitchen table between work and cooking, while her son
sat beside her. The problem of the double load faced by working women led settlement workers
to dig in on social insurance policies that bolstered male breadwinners.83
The books reflected the practical reality that women bore the burden of domestic care, and
seemed to confirm that a mother working would endure alarming physical ramifications. Almost
every time that Calkins described a wife working, the story ends with the wife becoming
extremely exhausted and sick. In Some Folks Won’t Work, stories of mothers forced to work tell
of the horror that came from it. A settlement worker told of one Polish woman who was “driven
out to do cleaning,” causing her health to spiral. Calkins’ telling reads as a warning to any
woman considering work, and as a confirmation to stalwart supporters of male centered
households: “The blood in her veins shone blue through her ghostly skin, and her eyes, a purplish
blue, seemed fixed upon a point in space where the Philadelphia courts, squalor, starvation, and
the kindness of neighbors were all as one. She was too tired to hear.”84 Exhaustion was but a
symptom compared to what other mothers suffered. Mrs. Shanti, who came from Russia, was
forced to work long hours to support her family. But “overwork and nerves wrecked Stacia’s
health,” Calkins told, “and a tumor developed in her breast.” According to Some Folks, Mrs.
Shanti was not alone in suffering from job-related ill-health. One Mrs. Daly, Calkins described,
found herself in bed with cancer from her job as a nighttime janitor: what began as a lump from
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hitting her head in an office she was cleaning, developed into a tumor, and then threatened her
life. It was from the very physical act of working as a cleaner that Mrs. Daly developed cancer. 85
In the end, the members of the NFS Unemployment Committee offered a narrative for
unemployment that cast women as dependent, and thus defenseless in the face of joblessness.
The circumstances of the Depression and the insufficiency of women’s work to provide for a
family prompted these reformers to push the boundaries of relief, by charging that the failures of
the relief system put families at greater risk for destitution and suggesting that relief not be
reserved solely for women. In the process, the Unemployment Committee both confirms and
challenges research on maternalism, demonstrating that ideology and material need often went
hand-in-hand in defending the male breadwinner household. In other words, the solution they
proposed was intended to improve the conditions of women, but functioned to cement in
unemployment regulation the prerogatives of the male breadwinner family, and the ultimate
dependence of women and mothers. By calling for a sweeping, yet non-radical responses to
cyclical unemployment the Unemployment Committee articulated a position that could catalyze
change without scaring off middle-class, educated Americans.

Reception and Outcomes
In the wake of finishing their survey of, and writing on, unemployment settlement workers
embarked on the dynamic process of bringing workers’ voices to legislators and policy experts.
Their priority was to translate the difficulties of unemployment to lawmakers, so they focused
their attention more on personal stories than specific policy. By reaching out to the voting public,
contacting politicians, and continuing to work with the unemployed, settlement workers created a
“middle-out” method for policy change.
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Among the voting public, the Unemployment Committee’s research was received quite well,
and Some Folks Won’t Work certainly made its way onto the nightstands of educated, reading
Americans. Reviews by sympathetic readers emphasized the positive impact that such a study
could make on the campaign for unemployment insurance. Paul Douglas, an economist whose
research also dealt with unemployment, wrote an ad for the book that aimed right at such a
readership.
If the settlements and Miss Calkins do not cut through the stiff hide of middle-class
indifference with these moving chronicles of heroism and human loss, then there is no
hope for the improvement of the world by pity.86
The Chicago Daily Tribune echoed Douglas’ description, if much more briefly, and in 1930
Some Folks Won’t Work made it onto the Tribune’s best book list (along, it should be said, with
136 other books).87 By 1931, Some Folks Won’t Work was into its fourth edition and, according
the Unemployment Committee, “selling steadily.”88
Settlement leaders took their research to the voting public through various other mediums.
Graham Taylor, though not a member of the Unemployment Committee (but the father of Lea D.
Taylor) published a compelling piece in the Chicago Daily News, simultaneously advertising and
explaining the arguments presented in Some Folks Won’t Work. For a largely conservative
readership, Taylor described the pitiable state of joblessness and warned of the danger of
inaction. “A man respected by wife and children gradually loses their respect and his own selfrespect as he fails to be their bread-winner,” Taylor lamented.89 In January of 1932 Helen Hall
continued to reach out to the public in a lecture given in Detroit, Michigan. As the Detroit News
described it (in an article that also expanded her audience), Hall explained to the audience that
the first job of industry and the government is “stabilization of employment,” and continued by
advocating or “long time planning of public works.”90 In this, Taylor and Hall thus acted on the
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settlement commitment to translating knowledge of the unemployed to a middle-class, voting
audience.
The Committee used a few methods to translate this knowledge to policy makers and
politicians. In 1931 Congress debated the Wagner Bill S. 3060, which would have created a
federal employment exchanges to regulate unemployment, and the Unemployment Committee
worked feverishly to lobby for its passage. The meeting minutes of the Committee reveal that its
members believed that “only sufficient pressure from [the] country will bring [the bill] to a
hearing before March 1st,” and soon after committee members exhorted settlement workers from
around the country to press their representatives for action on the bill.91
Members of the Unemployment Committee also directly appealed to legislators and
policymakers. After the publication of Some Folks Won’t Work Helen Hall sent a copy to
Frances Perkins, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor, and soon after
met with Samuel Joseph (of the College of the City of New York), Perkins, and Paul Kellogg, to
discuss strategies for passing Wagner’s bill.”92 Then, in 1932, Hall and other members of the
Unemployment Committee traveled to Madison, Wisconsin, to support the passage of the
Wisconsin Unemployment Insurance Bill (the nation’s first), recognizing that, as Hall said to the
NFS, “It is not a model bill, indeed its chief virtue is that it could be passed. Its terms had to be
conservative.” A few months later Hall testified before a commission in Columbus, Ohio, that
aimed to pass a more robust bill for unemployment insurance.93 By the end of 1932 the NFS was
clear on the role that settlement workers could take in securing legislation, stating in a resolution:
“Whereas, the National Federation of Settlements, Inc. has already endorsed the
principle of unemployment insurance, be it resolved that we now re-affirm this
stand and urge all our members at this time to throw the weight of their conviction
toward expediting the passage of appropriate laws in their respective states.”94
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Hall personally positioned herself to make recommendations to policymakers. Early in 1931
she used her newfound position as an expert on unemployment to urge Pennsylvania Gifford
Pinchot to organize a state committee on unemployment, and pushed for statewide labor
exchanges.95 Hall also served on a Philadelphia task force that made recommendations for longterm structural reforms, and advised well as NY Senator Robert Wagner as he wrote a series of
bills calling for public works for the unemployed. A strongly worded letter written by Helen Hall
on behalf of the NFS to President Roosevelt received warm reception. Perhaps most
significantly, in 1934, when President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order creating the
Committee on Economic Security, Helen Hall and Paul Kellogg both sat on its Advisory
Council. In these capacities, Hall was able to convey the experiences of the unemployed to
policymakers.96
Settlement workers in the Unemployment Committee, however, maintained their intimate
connection with unemployed workers themselves. At the city level, committee member Lea D.
Taylor spearheaded efforts to manage unemployment in Chicago. Taylor helped to orchestrate
citywide public hearings on unemployment, in which hundreds of individuals impacted by
unemployment testified to the deprivation and social disorganization they experience. In concert
with Chicago’s Worker’s Committee on Unemployment, reformers and labor activists
orchestrated in a successful campaign for state funding for the unemployed.
This research complicates standard perceptions of the settlement house movement. Much of
the available scholarship suggests that, in the wake of the First World War and in the midst of
growing emphasis on professionalization, settlement house workers embraced casework over
reform. Moreover, virtually none of this research discusses how conceptions of gender shaped
settlement workers’ perception of unemployment and the growing financial crisis. Robyn
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Muncy’s Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, for instance, takes gender seriously
but positions settlement reform as happening at the federal level. Clarke Chambers’ classic
Seedtime of Reform offers a counter to this position, demonstrating that settlement workers’
“persistent crusading” sped the process by which lawmakers proposed and legislated policies on
social insurance, but neglects to analyze the precise arguments they made for social insurance,
particularly with relation to gender. By bringing research on maternalist reform into conversation
with scholarship on the settlement house movement, it becomes clear that settlement house
workers both played a role in social reform even while providing support in the form of
casework, and that through it all they embraced gendered notions of work, the family, and the
role of the federal government. 97
Their work also complicates the way we might think about the creation of policy on labor
and welfare. Settlement workers in the 1920’s and 1930’s demonstrate that policy change did not
come primarily from below (although the unemployed workers’ movement was quite significant)
or from above (for instance, policy makers and the federal government). Rather, social policy
change was something that happened in the middle – among reformers who could translate the
experience of laborers for the voting public and political leaders. This point offers a counter to a
popular narrative about Progressive social politics: that, as Daniel Rodgers put it, “What
ultimately put social insurance back on the agenda in the early 1930’s was …the quiet, structural,
behind-the-scenes institutionalization of European-acquired social insurance knowledge in the
key university economics departments and policy centers.”98 Hall herself was at least
tangentially related to many of these economics departments, as she had close relationships with
both Paul Douglas and Paul Kellogg.
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It would be a mistake to overstate their influence on policy details, as settlement workers
were not primarily invested in shaping specific pieces of policy. Settlement workers like Hall
understood their purpose as providing a link between jobless workers and legislators, for their
specialized knowledge lay in the personal experience of the unemployed, not the nuances of
social policy. Thus, they worked to educate policymakers on the very human issue of joblessness
rather than crafting legislation, to persuade more people (voters, legislators) to support social
insurance. To be sure, settlement workers had opinions on policy – for instance, in a 1935 report
regarding their work on the Advisory Council Hall and Kellogg reflected dismay that they were
not able to shape the Social Security Act to include stronger state standards and a greater federal
contribution.99
But their work significantly played a role in ensuring the passage of, broadly speaking,
policies to protect the unemployed. So, for instance, while they clearly favored the Ohio plan
over the Wisconsin plan, settlement workers threw their weight behind both, because they both
intended to arrest destitution among the unemployed. And their weight proved to be influential.
As NFS meeting minutes report, committees in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Congress (such as the
LaFollette-Costigan committee) all asked for and drew on the Unemployment Committee
research in crafting policy. This fits their goals: it is striking that Hall (and Kellogg and Douglas,
for that matter) believed that a project to change public opinion was crucial for gaining
legislation on unemployment.
Because they re-centered debates for unemployment insurance onto jobless workers’
families, the Unemployment Committee was able to introduce to their economically illiterate
readers the natural cycles of a capitalist economy. At the same time, they catalyzed the creation
of empathy among the voting public, enabling voters to fully understand the plight of the jobless.
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Yet their argument came at a cost, for it relied on a distinction between the jobless who deserved
unemployment insurance, and those who had long relied on charity. Well before the New Deal,
settlement workers recommended that some poor Americans were “entitled” to government
assistance, and thus contributed to the creation of the two-tiered welfare state.100
By holding the economic system to task while mobilizing the rhetoric of male breadwinner
families, settlement workers presented fairly radical recommendations for dealing with
unemployment (social insurance) alongside traditional and widely accepted conceptions of social
structures, which reassured readers of the non-radical nature of their campaign and demonstrated
that federal insurance would preserve, rather than revolutionize, the American social fabric.
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